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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Among men of honor a word is a bond 
Any doubts about the relative status of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and 
President Dmitri Medvedev seemed to dissipate in the midst of the crisis over 
South Ossetia and Russia's invasion of Georgia.  While some Russian analysts 
suggested that the timing of the crisis put Medvedev in the spotlight (and 
angered Putin, who had departed for China), it clearly was Putin's actions and his 
visibility that garnered international attention.  From his high profile appearance 
at the Olympics and conversations with President Bush, to his early departure 
from Beijing and his mission to the refugees and wounded in Vladikavkaz, Putin 
certainly appeared to be in charge.  The focus on Medvedev, particularly his role 
in negotiating ceasefire terms, largely has reenergized the question of whether or 
not he has any real authority in Russia. 
 
Putin also served to underscore the issue when he returned from Vladikavkaz.  
Not missing an opportunity to exert his authority, Putin made public 
"recommendations" to Medvedev that sounded decidedly more like orders:  "I 
think it would be the correct course of action, Dmitry Anatolyevich, for you to 
instruct the Military Prosecutor’s Office to document episodes of this type, all the 
more so as most of the population of South Ossetia are citizens of the Russian 
Federation. The things I heard about today from the refugees are clearly crimes 
against the civilian population.  As I said, I think it would be right for the President 
to issue this instruction to the Military Prosecutor’s Office." (1) 
 
When French President and current European Union head Nicolas Sarkozy 
arrived in Moscow to negotiate a ceasefire, President Medvedev returned to 
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center stage.  In a press conference following negotiations, Medvedev 
announced that he had signed the ceasefire agreement and that Russian troops 
would be withdrawing from Georgia. "The fact of the matter is that a reinforced 
Russian peacekeeping contingent carried out an operation to enforce peace on 
the Georgian leadership. This operation has been successful, and we are 
therefore ending it.  Today was the right moment to end this operation, and not 
yesterday or tomorrow. We have therefore declared a temporary ceasefire until a 
full solution to the problem can be achieved in accordance with the principles that 
we just named." (2) 
 
As days passed, Russian troops surged forward further into Georgia and dug in, 
but most decidedly they did not withdraw.  This disparity between the Russian 
president's deeds and the military's actions prompted the US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice to remark: "Well, I just know that the Russian president said 
several days ago Russian military operations would stop. They didn't. The 
Russian president told President Sarkozy that the minute that cease-fire was 
signed by President Saakashvili, Russian forces would begin to withdraw. They 
didn't. Now he has said that tomorrow, midday, Russian forces will withdraw and 
withdraw to their pre-August 6, 7 lines. This time I hope he means it. You know, 
the, the word of the Russian president needs to be upheld by his forces. People 
are going to begin to wonder if Russia can be trusted. I, I think it's really very 
much time for them to do what they say they're going to do." (3) 
 
Searching for an answer to this gap between Medvedev's agreement to withdraw 
and the contrary actions of the Russian military, speculation centered on a power 
vacuum at the pinnacle of Russian executive authority.  Was Medvedev unable 
to deliver a ceasefire?  Were Russian armed forces under his control?  Putin's?  
The debate over the true center of authority in the Russian leadership appears 
unwarranted.  Internally, there is no indication that Russia's political 
establishment is disconcerted by the military leadership's behavior.  Indeed, their 
actions do not appear at odds.  President Medvedev, citing reasons for the delay 
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in implementing the withdrawal that did not include dissent from his generals, set 
a new deadline for withdrawal:  August 18 at Noon.  While there seems to be a 
halt to the advance in some sectors at least and Russian troops have “lowered 
their profile” in parts of Georgia, reports indicate that Russian positions, in fact, 
were reinforced the night before the deadline.  President Medvedev, appearing in 
Vladikavkaz to decorate servicemen, underscored the Russian intent to 
withdraw, as did his Deputy Chief of Staff Anatoli Nogovitsyn, who said: "The 
pull-out of peacekeeping forces started today."  (4)  Nonetheless, an actual full 
withdrawal of Russian troops to the positions held on August 8 seems 
increasingly unlikely.  What has become apparent is that the Russian 
leadership's word, and even the president's signature on an international 
agreement, does not necessarily reflect their intention to honor that agreement. 
 
Russia's resort to force in its invasion of Georgia, coupled with its refusal to 
honor its commitments in an appropriate and timely manner have done serious, 
perhaps irreparable, damage to its reputation.  The decision by the Putin-
Medvedev administration to circumvent every conceivable international institution 
in which it could have addressed its claims concerning events in South Ossetia 
reveals its disdain for those institutions.  As such, its membership in key 
international organizations, and certainly its pending membership in the WTO, 
becomes an open question.  The reliability of a partner that so brazenly refuses 
to honor its word should give pause to any other state with which Russia has 
dealings.  Certainly, financial managers and investors will have to take account of 
the Russian state's irresponsible behavior, particularly as they assess companies 
wholly or partially intertwined with the state and its apparatchiki. 
 
Russia managed, in the short term, to demonstrate its military superiority vis à vis 
a significantly smaller and weaker state, but this act of intimidation, so much 
more in keeping with an organized crime syndicate than a responsible member of 
the international community, likely will boomerang back on this hapless diarchy 
(if, indeed, this constitutes an appropriate term to describe Russia’s current 
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leadership).  Once again, Russian overreaching could well accelerate the very 
trends it apparently hoped to forestall. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "Beginning of working Meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 10 Aug 08 
via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/10/0343_type82913_205084.shtml, 
accessed 17 Aug 08. 
(2) "Press Statement following Negotiations with French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy," 12 Aug 08 via http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/12/2100_ 
type82912type82914type82915_205208.shtml, accessed 17 Aug 08. 
(3) "Meet the Press" Transcript for August 17, 2008 via 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26252093/. 
(4) " Russia ‘starts Georgia pull-back,’” 18 Aug 08, BBC News via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7567184.stm. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Plan to “counteract corruption” introduced 
Ending months of speculation about his oft repeated desire to emphasize the rule 
of law and end the corruption plaguing Russian business and government 
functions, President Dmitri Medvedev announced on July 31 that he had signed 
the Plan to Counteract Corruption on July 19.  The Plan to Counteract Corruption 
was the result of a joint effort by the Kremlin-established Counter-Corruption 
Council and an inter-agency working group. The Council was supervised closely 
by Medvedev, who participated in the planning process and rejected the first draft 
“for its complacency.” (1) The adoption of the Plan to Counteract Corruption was 
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announced at a meeting on property rights for small and medium-sized 
businesses in Gagarin, where the president guaranteed that “the work on it will 
be started in the short run.” (2) 
 
Medvedev’s plan is the latest in a long series of Russian anti-corruption 
legislation. During the 1990s, several drafts were produced, and one was even 
voted on before being vetoed by then-President Yeltsin.  In 2000, the process 
was repeated, but the legislation failed to produce results. (3) Putin’s team 
drafted a law aimed at preventing corruption in 2007, but it was tabled in 
anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Aside from the fact that a 
plan to regulate corruption has never been approved by the Duma, the other 
major obstacle to Russia’s fight against corruption is the lack of an existing legal 
definition of the term.  Generally, “corruption” could be defined as the misuse of 
public authority for profit, but the actual term is not found anywhere in Russian 
law. (4) The newest iteration of anti-corruption law in Russia is careful to define 
corruption before it outlines its plan to combat it. 
 
Medvedev’s Plan to Counteract Corruption is concise, consisting of only four 
sections, each dedicated to one central topic, including “new laws; measures to 
improve governance, personnel training and emergency anti-corruption actions.” 
(5) It will be sent to the Duma for ratification in September. 
 
The plan will create units designed to work against corruption from within the 
personnel departments of state-level governmental bodies, effectively shifting 
control to a lower level, in order to ensure tighter monitoring of individuals.  
These units will eliminate the need for a central department by giving civil 
servants more responsibility for reporting suspicious conduct. Monitoring 
employee behavior is a large part of the plan, as standards also been have set 
for investigating the property and financial holdings of government employees 
and their families. (6) 
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The legislation includes a clause that sets administrative penalties for companies 
involved in any level of corruption.  This means that a company is responsible not 
only for its official conduct and that of its spokespeople, but for each individual 
employee.  Critics have compared this new policy to “punishing a football club for 
the misbehavior of its fans,” but proponents of the plan argue that it provides 
strong motivation for companies to take more responsibility for what happens 
within their ranks. (7) 
 
In keeping with Medvedev’s focus on prevention, rather than punishment, the 
penalties already in place for corruption-related crimes will not change.  The new 
plan instead makes punishment for such behavior a certainty, rather than a 
possibility. (8) Any city or region failing to comply with the Plan to Counteract 
Corruption would be subject to what Medvedev called his “proletarian legality,” 
where small businesses would be given the opportunity to buy any building they 
are currently renting or leasing. (9) 
 
Medvedev’s consistent focus on fighting corruption since his inauguration could 
be seen as his first major attempt to separate himself from former President 
Putin.  
 
Despite his ability to orchestrate the return of a sense of political and social 
stability, one success that eluded Putin was to solidify the country’s financial 
system by eliminating the threat of corruption. Russia’s economic success is 
undermined daily by reports of corruption and the absence of a system to ensure 
the success of small businesses, one of the most frequent targets for 
government authorities looking to solicit bribes. Medvedev has taken up the 
cause of small businesses, which he presents as the cornerstone of his plan to 
make Russia more attractive to international investors. (10) 
 
Since January 2008, 26,787 reported crimes have been classified as 
“corruption,” including 8,594 reported instances of accepting bribes.  This is an 
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11 percent increase from the same period last year. (11) Russia’s recent 
economic scandals have made the country less and less desirable to outside 
investors, as such issues point to the failure of the rule of law, undermining the 
country’s burgeoning reputation as an economic power. 
 
In the past decade, Russia has ratified both the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption and United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
each of which outline clear standards for fighting against corruption.  Although 
membership in these organizations lends Russia credibility, it has failed, as yet, 
to report to either body. (12) Should the plan go into effect, it also will place one 
preexisting governmental structure, most likely either the Prosecutor General’s 
Office or the Justice Ministry, in charge of monitoring and following the 
international anti-corruption standards for the conventions that Russia has 
signed. (13) 
 
Other widespread abuses include officials failing to fully disclose financial 
information, combining private entrepreneurial activity with government contract 
work, managing public companies, using government equipment for personal 
gain, and accepting bribes for expediting citizens’ requests. (14) Most of the time, 
these activities are not reported because the other parties involved also benefit 
from the situation. There may be another, more insidious force behind the 
acceptance of corruption.  According to Aleksandr Anikin, head of the committee 
within the Russian Federation’s General Prosecutor’s Office, the current situation 
is indicative of a general “mental collapse,” where people are no longer hesitant 
to take or accept bribes or steal from the state. (15) The most effective way to 
combat this, he stresses, may not be to appeal to people’s consciences, but to 
scare them, instead. 
 
Doping scandal  
Despite Russia’s ongoing efforts to rehabilitate its image, an announcement by 
the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) two weeks ago 
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undermined confidence in Russia’s Olympic sports program.  On July 31, the 
IAAF suspended seven members of Russia’s track and field team on suspicions 
of cheating, after finding "a fraudulent substitution of urine which is both a 
prohibited method and also a form of tampering with the doping control process." 
(16) The athletes in question include Yelena Soboleva, the current world 
champion in the 800-meter run, along with a handful of other medal hopefuls 
from various track and field disciplines. 
 
The suspensions came after a one and a half year-long IAAF-sanctioned sting 
operation into a sudden surge in the prowess of several of the members of the 
Russian track and field team.  Initially, every athlete tested negative for drug use. 
(17) But, as experts compared samples taken from the athletes during and after 
competitions, it became apparent that they were not from the same sources. 
 
In the week that followed, IAAF officials suspended cyclist Vladimir Gusev, as 
well as one active member and two alternates from the race walking team on 
suspicions of performance-enhancing drug use. (18) When asked about Team 
Russia’s ongoing scandal, the head of the International Olympic Committee's 
medical commission, Arne Ljungqvist, described the situation as “an example of 
systematic, planned doping" and “planned cheating,” (19) suggesting that the 
scandal has a broad base that includes far more than the few competitors who 
have been caught thus far. 
 
The IAAF’s announcement came at the worst possible time for Russian sports 
officials, as the Beijing Olympic Games had been Russia’s opportunity to shrug 
off past mistakes and reemerge on the world stage as a sports machine. Odds 
makers had considered Russia a solid contender likely to trail only China and the 
United States for both most gold medals and most overall medals won. (20) 
 
Last January, Russia’s sports minister announced the creation of RusADA, an 
independent anti-doping agency dedicated to preventing the use of performance 
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enhancing drugs.  RusADA, which was modeled after USADA, the United States’ 
anti-doping agency, was also responsible for handling any doping cases.  The 
agency was created in response to a particularly bad year in which seven 
Russians were banned from competition for two years by the International 
Rowing Federation and several Russian track and field team members tested 
positive for illegal substances. (21) 
 
RusADA voiced its displeasure at the timing of the IAAF’s announcement, 
accusing the organization of withholding the information until the Olympics in 
order “to make life difficult for the Russian team” and calling Ljungqvist’s 
statement “premature”. (22) For its part, the IAAF denied any connection 
between the Olympic games and its decision, arguing that it needed to be 
completely certain before making any accusations. (23) 
 
After dominating the sports world for years as part of the Soviet Union, the quality 
of Russian sports dropped sharply during the 1990s and early 2000s.  During the 
Olympic games in Athens and in the preparations for this year’s games in Beijing, 
however, the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) had been working to revamp 
the program into something that could recapture its past glory.  One part of the 
ROC’s plan has been to capitalize on the recent countrywide rise in patriotism; 
the other component of the plan has included major state investment in the 
modernization of athletic facilities and training programs in every sports 
discipline.  Between 2005 and 2008, an estimated 12 billion rubles ($510 million) 
was budgeted for Olympic preparations. (24) 
 
Part of this financial windfall also has been allocated to increase Russia’s bonus 
system for winning athletes, for the first time since 1996. In mid-July, the ROC 
announced that gold medals, which had previously earned an athlete $50,000, 
would now be worth $160,000. Silver and bronze medal values were raised as 
well, with silver increasing from $20,000 to $60,000 and bronze from $10,000 to 
$40,000.  This money is in addition to the gifts showered on winning athletes by 
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their local governments, which range from housing and cars to appliances and 
cash. (25) 
 
Cash incentives are supposed to motivate athletes to do their best and bring 
honor and glory back to Russia.  However, in the wake of the ongoing scandal, it 
appears that some of the athletes took the push to win a little too far. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Dimitri Kazmin, Elena Ragozina, Alexei Nikolsky, “The Medvedev plan,” 
Vedomosti, 4 Aug 08 via 08 via David Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 4 Aug 08, 
2008-#141, 4 Aug 08.   
(2) “Russian officials clarify aspects of anticorruption plan,” Itar-Tass, 1 Aug 08 
via David Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 4 Aug 08, 2008-#141, 4 Aug 08. 
(3) “High stakes in Russia’s corruption battle,” Opendemocracy.net, 28 Jul 08 via 
David Johnson’s Russia List, 1 Aug 08, 2008-#140. 
(4) “High stakes in Russia’s corruption battle,” ibid. 
(5) Anastasia Kornya, Kira Latukhina, “New anti-corruption plan is signed, to be 
put into motion before long,” Vedomosti, 1 Aug 08 via David Johnson’s Russia 
List, 1 Aug 08, 2008-#140. 
(6) “Kornya, Latukhina,” ibid. 
(7) “Russian officials clarify aspects of anticorruption plan,” ibid. 
(8) Tatyana Netreba and Tatyana Kuznetsova, “Interview with Aleksandr Anikin, 
head of an anticorruption administration at the Russian Federation General 
Prosecutor's Office,” Argumenty i Fakty, 1 Aug 08 via David Johnson’s Russia 
List (JRL), 4 Aug 08, 2008-#141, 4 Aug 08. 
(9) “Russian officials clarify aspects of anticorruption plan,” ibid. 
(10) Tatyana Netreba and Tatyana Kuznetsova, ibid.  
(11) “Russian Prosecutor's Office Aide Comments on Anticorruption Campaign,” 
Argumenty i Fakty, 1 Aug 08 via David Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 4 Aug 08, 
2008-#141, 4 Aug 08. 
(12) “High stakes in Russia’s corruption battle,” ibid. 
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(13) Tatyana Netreba and Tatyana Kuznetsova, ibid.  
(14) “Russian Prosecutor's Office Aide Comments on Anticorruption Campaign,” 
ibid.  
(15) Ibid. 
(16) David Martin, “Doping charges hit Russia hopes,” SportingLife.com, 31 Jul 
08 via http://www.sportinglife.com/story_get.cgi?STORY_ 
NAME=others/08/07/31/OLYMPICS_Russia_Nightlead.html#.  Last accessed 8 
Aug 08. 
(17) “Russia faces drug scandal of BALCO proportions,” Jamaica Gleaner, 1 Aug 
08 via http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20080801/sports/sports3.html. 
Last accessed 8 Aug 08. 
(18) Sonia Oxley, “Russia denies "systematic" doping,” Reuters, 6 Aug 08 via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Olympics/idUSL613959720080806. Last 
accessed 8 Aug 08. 
(19) Ibid. 
(20) “Russia odds to win,” The Spread via http://www.thespread.com/sports-
betting- top-stories-900/russia-odds-to-win-all-events-at-2008-beijing-summer-
oly.html. Last accessed 8 Aug 08. 
(21) Gennady Fyodorov, “Russia to create independent anti-doping agency,” 
Reuters, 18 Jan 08 via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idUSL187777420080118.  Last 
accessed 8 Aug 08. 
(22) Sonia Oxley, ibid. 
(23) “Russia faces drug scandal of BALCO proportions,” ibid.  
(24) Anthony Johnston, “Digging the gold,” Russia Profile, 29 Jul 08 via David 
Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 30 Jul 08, 2008-#139. 
(25) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Fabian Adami 
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Lavrov in Beijing 
On 21 July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in Beijing at the 
invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi. The central purpose of the 
visit apparently was to enable the two countries to sign a treaty finally resolving a 
long-running border dispute, which has been raging since the Qing dynasty. It 
has been resolved in the main since the end of the Cold War, with the notable 
exception of the Amur River islands of Heixiazi and Yinlong (called Tarabov and 
Bolshoi Ussuri by Russia), which were the site of armed clashes during the Cold 
War. (1)  
    
The islands are to be divided along agreed demarcation lines—approximately 50-
50—and those parts of the islands belonging to China will be handed over to 
Beijing in a formal ceremony some time before the end of September (in order 
not to overshadow the Olympic Games), according to General Valeri Putov, Chief 
of the FSB’s Far East Department. (2)  
    
Other issues also were addressed, as Lavrov met with Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao and President Hu Jintao during his visit. Russia and China have decided 
to implement their Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 
expanding their strategic cooperation before the end of 2008 and have decided 
to hold talks in the near future to negotiate a “bilateral energy negotiation 
mechanism.” (3) The two countries also plan to introduce a visa-free system of 
travel between themselves, in order to promote easier economic and social 
contacts. (4)  
    
With the exception of the border agreement, Lavrov’s visit had all the appearance 
of a love-in, with both sides at pains to stress how important the other is to it. (5) 
But, it would be wrong to conclude that there is nothing behind the talk. Russia 
has problems on its Western and Caucasus fronts—as ABM, the NATO 
membership aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine, and current events in Georgia 
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demonstrate. Lavrov’s détente trip to China therefore, may constitute a Russian 
effort, reminiscent of actions taken by Nikita Khrushchev during the 1958-61 
Berlin Crisis, to secure its eastern flank, so that it can fully focus its attentions to 
the West and South, where the Kremlin perceives clear and present dangers. 
 
ABM update 
During the last few months, there has been little movement in the dispute 
between Russia and the United States over the latter’s planned ABM shield 
(intended to guard against Iranian nuclear proliferation). Russia has, on a 
number of occasions, made clear that it views the system overall, and the 
European component specifically, as a direct threat.  Moscow claims that under 
cover of installing Patriot missiles, the US may instead station medium range 
nuclear tipped ballistic missiles in Poland. (6)  
    
The United States has attempted to assuage Moscow’s concerns by offering to 
allow verification visits by Russian officials, an offer that has been rejected, with 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov promising that there would be a “military-
technical” response to the ABM system and insisting on a permanent military 
observer presence at the planned facilities at a minimum. (7)  
    
Late in July, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit, Lavrov held brief 
discussions with Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, during which the ABM 
issue was discussed once more. After the meeting, Lavrov met with Russian TV 
reporters, and revealed that he had impressed upon Rice the need to “clarify” the 
ABM issue farther, noting that the “transparency and confidence building 
measures promised…do not materialize into something concrete and tangible so 
far.” (8)  
    
Lavrov also claimed that he had emphasized to his US counterpart the need to 
speed up negotiations on a new Strategic Arms Limitation agreement, given that 
START 1 becomes defunct at the end of next year. Russia, Lavrov noted, does 
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not “want to leave a vacuum in this important issue.” Secretary Rice apparently 
agreed with at least this aspect of Lavrov’s comments. (9)  
    
The final development of interest in relation to the ABM shield is that the Polish 
government has extended invitations to Lavrov and President Dmitri Medvedev, 
asking that they come to Warsaw at an as-yet unspecified date, in order to 
discuss a number of issues, including ABM. Poland’s ambassador in Moscow, 
Jerzy Bahr, stated that Poland wishes to have a “dialogue” with its neighbor, in 
the hopes that talks will “change Russia’s evaluation” of the stationing of a “few 
interceptors” that “hardly…pose a threat to one of the world’s powers.” (10)  
    
What accommodations Poland can make is an open question: although the 
planned bases will be on Polish soil, they will be US facilities. Therefore, even if 
Warsaw were inclined to consider Moscow’s “permanent presence” demands, it 
is likely to run into objections—if not a veto—from Washington. As such, it is safe 
to say that the ABM issue, at least for the time being, is at an impasse.  
    
It is evident that the United States is determined to build its ABM system. 
Whether the missile component is stationed in Poland or elsewhere remains to 
be seen. It is entirely possible that Moscow is seeking to place the issue on a 
back-burner for now, in the hopes of extracting the maximum concessions for its 
acquiescence from a new presidential administration early in 2009. The most 
obvious target for concessions is the question of NATO expansion, and the 
Kremlin may seek to create a linkage between ABM and that issue. 
 
SCO foreign ministers’ meeting 
Several days after the ASEAN summit, Lavrov traveled to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 
for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Foreign Ministers.  
The main purpose of the meeting was to lay the groundwork for the SCO Heads 
of State meeting, which will take place on 28 August. The ministers examined 
and coordinated a draft of the Dushanbe Declaration, a joint communiqué that is 
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to be released after the main summit. The document’s emphasis lies in 
promoting the “reinforcement of security and stability and in the development of 
many-sided and mutually advantageous cooperation in the economic and 
humanitarian fields,” as well as in proposing ways to improve the SCO’s 
functions. (11) 
 
Specific items that are to be on the Heads of State Agenda include the drugs 
trade, Afghanistan, the illicit arms trade in the region, and the scheduling of joint 
anti-terrorist exercises. (12)  
    
One issue that the Foreign Ministers apparently devoted some time to was the 
question of Iran’s application for associate membership in the SCO. At this point 
in time, Iran is an SCO Observer, and the organization has a moratorium on 
accepting new entrants. The idea of lifting that blockage was discussed by the 
Foreign Ministers. (13) Lavrov’s comments after the meeting indicate the 
moratorium remains in place. Iran, Lavrov stated, could not become an associate 
member, since such status does not exist in the organization. (14) Expansion is 
not on the heads of states’ agenda, but the SCO is committed to “steps that will 
allow observers to take part in SCO’s activities that evoke their interests.” (15) 
    
Russia is to take over the Presidency of the SCO on August 29th. Given that fact, 
it is likely that the decision to maintain the moratorium was Moscow’s decision, 
and it seems reasonable to ask what Russia’s game is. Iran is a country of major 
concern to the US and the West generally speaking. Is Russia keeping Iran out 
of, what is after all in part a military alliance, using it as a bargaining chip to 
obtain diplomatic victories in other matters that concern it more? 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Territorial Issue Finally Resolved Between Russia, China,” Interfax, 21 Jul 
08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
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(2) “PRC Scholar Hails Russia’s Return of Island To China During FM Lavrov’s 
Visit. Roundup By ZTS Reporter Hai Ci: ‘Russia’s Foreign Minister Visits China 
To Put An End To the Border Disputes And Remove Past Enmities Between 
China And Russia,” Zhonggou Tongxun She Online, 21 Jul 08; OSC Translated 
Text via World News Connection. 
(3) “Chinese Premier Meets Russian FM in Beijing,” Xinhua News Agency, 21 Jul 
08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(4) “Russia, China To Sign Agreement on Visa-Free Travel For Businesses,” 
Channel One TV, 21 Jul 08; OSC Translated Excerpt via World News 
Connection. 
(5) “China Is Special To Russia,” Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 21 Jul 08; OSC 
Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(6) “U.S. May Station Ballistic Missiles Instead of Interceptors in Poland-
Kommersant Moscow," Kommersant.com, 10 Jul 08; OSC Transcribed Text via 
World News Connection. 
(7) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV, Number 14 (24 Jul 08).  
(8) “Russian FM’s Remarks To TV Questions Following Meeting With US 
Secretary of State. Transcript of Response by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov To Questions from Rossiya TV After Meeting With US Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice, Singapore, 23 July, 2008,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 Jul 
08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(9) “Russian Minister Calls For More Active Work On New Strategic Arms 
Treaty,” Interfax, 23 Jul 08; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(10) “Poland Wants Russia’s Top Leaders To Come For Visit,” PAP, 6 Aug 08; 
OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(11) “Russia Previews 25 July SCO Dushanbe Meeting. Press Release: Meeting 
Of The Council of Foreign Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 
Dushanbe,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 Jul 08; OSC Transcribed Text via 
World News Connection.  
(12) “Russian FM Remarks Following SCO Council of Foreign Minister’s Meeting; 
Opening Remarks and Transcript of Responses to Questions from Russian and 
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Foreign Media by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov at Joint 
Press Conference After Meeting of the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers, 
Dushanbe, July 25 2008,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 Jul 08; OSC Transcribed 
Text via World News Connection. 
(13) “Russia FM To Discuss in Dushanbe Preparations for SCO Summit,” ITAR-
TASS, 24 Jul 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(14) “Iran Sees Its Regional Potential As Good Chance for SCO-Jalili,” ITAR-
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Cracks in the monolith: Gazprom exports to be de-monopolized 
Six months and one president ago, stability was the Kremlin’s watchword and 
state-controlled monopolies were Russia’s national champions. Today, cracks 
are appearing in energy monoliths that once were pillars of the Russian 
economy, beginning on July 1 when national electricity monopoly, Unified Energy 
Systems ceased to exist. One week later, on July 7, Gazprom—national energy 
monopoly par excellence—found itself bedeviled by a proposal from the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service to strip away its exclusive right to export Russian gas. The 
proposal is a piece of pending legislation that, if passed, would require Gazprom 
to yield all surplus capacity of its extensive pipeline network to a government 
agency to be auctioned off to Russia’s independent natural gas producers, 
effectively bringing Gazprom’s monopoly to an end. (1) 
             
And what is Gazprom, if not a monopoly? It is currently the world’s largest 
producer of natural gas. (2) It accounts for 85% of the natural gas produced in 
Russia in the first half of 2008. It holds contracts to supply about 30% of Europe’s 
total gas volumes over the next fifteen to twenty years. (3) But it appears that it 
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will not be the sole exporter of Russian natural gas in the near future, and that is 
quite something. 
             
Exclusive rights for exporting natural gas were granted to Gazprom back in 2006, 
when a law was passed formalizing the company’s de facto monopoly over 
Russia’s natural gas transport system. The law is framed around national 
security concerns: “[given] the necessity to protect the economic interests of the 
Russian Federation, to fulfill international gas export obligations, to ensure the 
supply of revenue to the federal budget and to support the fuel-energy balance of 
the Russian Federation.” (4) The law was a great boon for the company, 
legitimizing a monopoly that brought in profits of $28.1 billion in 2007 from the 
sale of Russian gas on foreign markets. (5) 
             
But with privilege came obligation. Gazprom is not a private enterprise born of a 
free market, but an instrument of the state, used to manage Russian assets in 
the name of greater goals. While export revenues may appear compelling, the 
corporate profit motive is often at odds with state policy goals such as supplying 
the domestic market with cheap natural gas. Gazprom’s commitment to the 
national gasification project means that the company must sell its gas at prices 
set by the government agency—a condition that has led to huge inefficiencies as 
cheap gas has replaced other fuels that transitioned to market prices, making 
Russia the largest gas consumer in the world today. (6) The country’s artificially 
depressed gas prices do not even cover the costs of production and 
transportation, meaning that Gazprom’s export revenues are being used to 
subsidize its domestic obligations. It is a cost the company cannot afford to bear 
at a time when it is in urgent need of capital to invest in new gas field 
development, new pipeline projects and existing infrastructure reconstruction, in 
order to arrest the decline in production that is threatening Russia’s natural gas 
sector. (7) 
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Here is demand that wants supply—but in a rigged market, independent 
producers are operating on the margins. Companies like Novatek, LUKoil, 
Surgutneftegaz, Rosneft and TNK-BP account for only around 15% of Russia’s 
natural gas production. (8) Dissuaded by the depressed price of gas on the 
domestic market and a lack of access to Gazprom’s proprietary transportation 
infrastructure, independent producers have few incentives to boost their 
production levels. Recognizing this, the Russian government resolved upon a 
price deregulation schedule in 2006 that gradually increases regulated gas prices 
till 2011, when prices are expected to reach a European market level, minus 
transportation costs and customs duties. (9) Gazprom officials, anticipating the 
emergence of independent natural gas producers to supply the domestic market 
and eager to redirect Gazprom’s own gas volumes to lucrative foreign markets, 
heartily endorsed the government’s pricing reform. (10) 
             
The same cannot be said for another point on the reform agenda, an amendment 
to the 2006 gas export law that would allow independent gas producers to 
participate in natural gas exports by granting access to gas pipelines, which 
currently are controlled exclusively by Gazprom. (11) On June 27, the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service submitted a draft of the new law “On supporting non-
discriminatory access to the gas transport system in the Russian Federation” to 
the Russian legislature. If approved, the law will stipulate that Gazprom’s 
interests shall be given priority to the extent that the company meets its 
contractual obligations to consumers. Whatever pipeline capacity remains 
unused by Gazprom shall be allocated to independent producers via open 
tender. (12) 
             
Gazprom officials have opted to keep their own council and decline to comment 
on the  proposals before the parliament. Their reticence effectively has stalled 
passage of the antimonopoly bill in the legislature. Gazprom representatives will 
say only that the company awaits a new proposal from the Federal Antimonopoly 
Service. (13) 
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In numbers alone, the changes anticipated by the new export scheme do not 
represent a particularly striking departure from the status quo. Spare capacity is 
already at a premium along Russia’s gas transportation corridor; the optimal 
scenario projected by the Federal Antimonopoly Service projects independent 
producers’ aggregate share in the pipelines topping off at 15% of total capacity. 
(14) Unimpressed by the paltriness of that figure, experts in the energy industry 
peg the minimum share of the national gas transportation system that Gazprom 
must relinquish in order to support a competitive energy market at 25%. (15) 
Anything less will yield a market that is skewed by gross disparity. Russia’s 
independent natural gas producers will not be competing with Gazprom in 
international markets regardless of whether or not the amendment is passed. 
Independents and monopolists alike are keenly aware that Russia benefits when 
prices are high. 
             
But the numbers are not the story. The story unfolded in the years when 
President Putin created an energy monopoly to serve the greater good of 
Russian national interests through an economic instrument. Gazprom was 
regarded as the exemplar of economic stability – an unassailable monolith. 
Recently, Prime Minister Putin remarked to Gazprom Chairman Alexei Miller that 
independent producers are experiencing difficulty accessing pipelines. These 
difficulties, Miller was given to understand, are not in Russia’s national interests. 
(16) 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) “Explanatory Note on the Proposal Submitted to the Government on the Non-
discriminatory Access to Gas Transportation System,” Russian Federal 
Antimonopoly Service, 12 Jul 06 via 
http://www.fas.gov.ru/monopoly/gas/a_7006.shtml. 
(2) “Gazprom: Questions and Answers,” Gazprom Corporate Website, 2008 via 
http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru/index.php?id=4. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
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GEORGIA 
Abkhazia extends its “borders” 
While much attention has been paid to the South Ossetian front of Russia’s 
march into Georgia, less notice has been taken of the actions in and around 
Abkhazia. Three days after the outbreak of hostilities, Abkhaz officials (with the 
encouragement and support of their Russian backers) seized the opportunity 
provided by the South Ossetian theater, and opened a second front against 
Tbilisi. On 10 August, Abkhaz officials announced their intention to take the 
Upper Kodori Gorge, a source of contention between Abkhaz and Georgian 
officials. The Abkhaz offered a “humanitarian corridor” for the “complete 
withdrawal” of Georgian forces from Kodori, threatening to launch an operation to 
“eliminate them” if they did not comply. (1) Separatist forces coordinated with 
Russian “peacekeepers” on the Kodori operation, (2) even as Russia increased 
the number of its troops in Abkhazia to 9,000. (3) 
 
Following the Kodori Gorge operation, Abkhaz authorities announced a unilateral 
decision to extend the boundaries of Abkhazia to the Inguri River, which they 
claim is the traditional border. (4)  This illegitimate demarcation encompasses a 
portion of Georgia’s Zugdidi region, as well as the Inguri hydroelectric power 
plant. 
 
Additionally, Abkhaz “President” Sergei Bagapsh announced on Sunday, 10 
August, that Abkhaz forces had entered the Gali region “to restore order in the 
peacekeeping forces' responsibility zone.” (5) The Gali district has been a 
continual source of conflict and small-scale violence since the initial Abkhaz war 
in the early nineties. The region has both ethnically Georgian and Abkhaz 
residents, who sometimes clash. 
 
Both the Gali and Kodori operations were clear attempts to establish Abkhaz 
control over disputed areas that had been sore spots for Sukhumi’s leadership 
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and both, apparently, were successful. Georgian forces and citizens were evicted 
from the Upper Kodori Gorge by 12 August, (6) with many of those expelled 
going to Kutaisi—Georgia’s second largest city and one already tense from the 
combination of refugees from earlier conflicts and a high unemployment rate. On 
the Gali front, Georgian sources announced on 16 August that Abkhaz forces 
had occupied 13 villages, extending past the Gali region. (7) Officials from the 
separatist republic denied this claim, stating instead that they were defending the 
new “border” and distributing humanitarian aid. (8) 
 
The actions in Abkhazia, particularly around the Gali region, mean that large 
numbers of ethnic Georgian refugees, already displaced multiple times by 
previous conflicts, will be heading to towns in western Georgia, most likely 
Kutaisi and Batumi. 
 
South Ossetian government dismissed 
South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity dismissed his entire government and 
declared a state of emergency on 18 August. (9) Kokoity claimed that his 
ministers had not responded adequately to the current crisis, in particular the 
need to rebuild South Ossetia’s infrastructure and to address the refugee crisis 
spawned by the recent fighting in Tskhinvali and other villages. 
 
The move may be an attempt to strengthen his control of the separatist 
government. However, the limits of Kokoity’s power and influence are certainly 
questionable, given the very close links ministers in his government have had 
with the Russian security services, even before the recent invasion. 
 
Disturbingly but unsurprisingly, Kokoity also has stated that South Ossetia will 
ask the Russian government to build a permanent Russian military base in the 
region. (10) 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Turkmenistan continues to play the gas game 
The Turkmen government’s natural gas supply commitments continue to multiply, 
as President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow tries to broker ever more contracts 
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with regional rivals for his country’s energy resources.  Over the past few weeks, 
Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow has continued his 
negotiations with Russia’s Gazprom and with China’s CNPC (China National 
Petroleum Corporation) over his country’s natural gas resources, signing pricing 
and investment agreements with the former and offering an additional 10 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas per year to CNPC (CNPC is currently under contract 
to purchase 30 billion cubic meters). (1)  Despite provoking Iranian ire last spring, 
when the Turkmen government hiked its gas export prices, deals for additional 
gas exports to Iran are back on the table – the managing director of the National 
Iranian Gas Company announced on August 10 that a delegation had arrived 
from Turkmenistan to discuss the possibility of increasing gas supplies to Iran. 
(2)  Another possible gas transaction could be in the offing, depending upon 
whether or not the Turkish government concludes a gas import deal with Iran 
next month.  Should the deal go through, Iran will pipe its own gas, as well as 
supplies from Turkmenistan, to Turkey. (3) 
 
Many experts consider the Turkmen president’s commitment to Gazprom as the 
most significant of these developments, some even going so far as to interpret 
the new contracts, part of Gazprom’s 25-year energy deal with the Turkmen 
government (the original deal was signed in 2003), as giving Russia the lion’s 
share of Turkmenistan’s gas resources.  During Aleksei Miller’s (Miller is the 
chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee) late July visit to Ashgabat, 
two agreements were signed, one which will allow the Turkmen government to 
change (and most likely increase) the price of its gas supplies to Gazprom, 
based on their market value, and a second to increase Russian investment in 
Turkmenistan’s energy infrastructure, particularly in the eastern part of the 
country.  In Miller’s own words: “An agreement was reached on funding and 
constructing new gas mains from the eastern part of the country by Gazprom, 
developing field infrastructure and increasing the capacity of the Turkmen section 
of the Precaspian gas pipeline up to 30 bn. cu. m. Gazprom will take part in the 
construction.”  The Precaspian pipeline project to which Miller referred was 
 26 
agreed upon by the Russian, Kazakh, and Turkmen presidents in May 2007 and 
once completed would deliver up to 10 billion cubic meters each from Kazakh 
and Turkmen natural gas fields to the Russian Federation. (4) 
 
However, precisely what price Gazprom will pay has yet to be decided.  For the 
time being, the Russian company continues to pay $150US per 1,000 cubic 
meters for Turkmen gas supplies, although starting in 2009, Gazprom officials 
have promised to pay (unspecified) “European” prices. Most of these gas 
supplies are re-exported to Ukraine and a portion of them are then sent on to 
Europe. (5) 
 
Consequently, what’s good for Turkmenistan undoubtedly will cause gas 
consumers in Ukraine and Europe to feel considerable discomfort, unless the 
plans for additional pipeline projects, such as the Trans-Caspian and Nabucco 
projects, come to fruition.  The Turkmen president has expressed interest in 
these projects, as well as in a number of others – the TAPI pipeline (which 
continues to progress on paper, if not on the ground), and the Central Asia-China 
pipeline, which is the only project currently under construction. (6)  None of this 
bodes well for natural gas consumers in the coming heating season. 
 
One further factor to consider is whether or not Turkmenistan actually possesses 
sufficient gas reserves to supply both the existing and planned pipeline projects.  
Berdimuhammedow seems confident, assuring CNPC officials that “Preliminary 
data shows that the underground reserves of Turkmen natural gas are much 
larger than it was estimated,” at his August 8 meeting with them in Beijing, (7) 
perhaps referring to the August 5 announcement of the discovery of a new gas 
condensate field in the Karakum Desert.  The South Gutlyayak field, whose total 
reserves as yet are unknown, is reported to be putting out 200,000 cubic meters 
of gas and condensate per day in test production. By 2007, Turkmenistan’s 
natural gas production had reached an annual rate of 69 billion cubic meters 
(2.43 trillion cubic feet), more than four times as much as its 1998 production 
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rate.  Some estimates put the country’s total natural gas reserves at 100 trillion 
cubic feet, (8) but until the results of an independent energy audit being 
conducted by the British firm Gaffney, Cline & Associates (9) have been 
published, no one will know for sure how many of his gas supply contracts 
Berdimuhammedow will be able to honor. 
 
However, this lack of knowledge does not seem to pose much, if any, obstacle to 
the president’s ongoing efforts to secure more export contracts – regional energy 
officials seem content to take the president at his word and continue to vie for 
additional export contracts.  Assuming that the results of the energy audit are 
favorable, the Turkmen government may be able to enjoy playing the gas game 
for decades to come. 
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